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Scientific Cultures of Non-Knowledge 
in the Controversy over Genetically Modified
Organisms (GMO)
The Cases of Molecular Biology and Ecology
How to Respond to Non-Knowledge?
How can and how should our societies deal with potential – and
possibly not even fully known and foreseeable – risks posed by
innovations and new products in areas such as nanotechnology,
agro-biotechnology, or chemistry? The editorial team of the Euro-
pean Environment Agency (EEA) report Late Lessons from Early
Warnings gives a rather unusual advice: “Acknowledge and re-
spond to ignorance, as well as uncertainty and risk, in technolo-
gy appraisal and public policy making” (EEA 2001, p. 168). This
recommendation is based on the analysis of fourteen cases of de-
layed recognition of environmental and health risks, amongst
them chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) – which contribute to the ozone
hole –, asbestos, and mad cow disease (BSE). 
Considering these and other examples, we argue that environ-
mental politics and research should take into account not only
known and (more or less) well-defined risks and uncertainties, but
also completely unknown, unanticipated and for a long time un-
recognised effects. This corresponds with new insights from sci-
ence and technology studies showing that the sciences do not only
generate knowledge but also increase ignorance concerning the
possible side effects of scientific innovations and their technolog-
ical application (Ravetz 1986, Funtowicz and Ravetz 2001, Wynne
1992, Nowotny et al. 2001).1 In order to clarify that such non-knowl-
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Abstract
The limits of scientific knowledge are an emerging problem in the
debates about technological risk. In an exemplary analysis of the
controversy surrounding genetically modified organisms (GMO),
we show that the epistemic settings of two involved scientific 
disciplines – molecular biology and ecology – entail different types 
of non-knowledge and deal with non-knowledge differently. Both
of these “scientific cultures of non-knowledge” are analysed along
five criteria: the way of dealing with unforeseen events, the way of
dealing with complexity and uncertainty, the temporal and spatial
scales of knowledge, the de- and re-contextualisation of knowl-
edge, and the epistemic (self-)reflexivity. The scientific culture of
non-knowledge in molecular biology can be described as control-
oriented, while that of ecology can be described as uncertainty-
oriented. This difference is mirrored in the societal discourses
and regulations concerning GMO. A greater variety of cultures of
non-knowledge seems likely, which calls for further analysis.
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How should science and society deal with the unknown, e. g., with risks that 
are not known or risks of which we do not even know that they are not known? 
The ways in which science produces knowledge also include specific practices of 
dealing with non-knowledge, which differ significantly between scientific disciplines 
such as molecular biology and ecology.
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edge is not simply “given by nature”, but the result of the growth
of knowledge itself, the British philosopher of science Jerry Ravetz
has termed it “man-made” or “science-based ignorance” (Ravetz
1990; for the distinction of the terms “ignorance” and “non-knowl-
edge”, see below).
It is crucial, therefore, to deal adequately and reflectively not
only with what we know, but also with what we do not know. Yet,
of course, the EEA editorial team is fully aware of the apparently
paradoxical and possibly unattainable character of its demand to
“respond to ignorance”: “At first sight, responding to ignorance
may seem to ask the impossible. How can strategies be devised
to prevent outcomes, which, by definition, are not known?” (EEA
2001, p. 170). 
In this article, we introduce the concept of “scientific cultures
of non-knowledge”, which offers new and promising perspectives
for dealing with this seemingly irresolvable question. The con-
cept of cultures of non-knowledge refers to the practices by which
different scientific (sub-)disciplines generate, acknowledge, and
communicate non-knowledge. The term “non-knowledge” (see
Weinstein and Weinstein 1978) indicates the general absence of
knowledge, regardless of its further contextual implications. “Ig-
norance”, in contrast, implies the theoretical availability of the
knowledge in question; “uncertainty” and “indeterminacy” im-
ply the recognition of a lack of knowledge, as well as its further
qualitative specification.2
Our research project3 aims at exploring new ways of self-re-
flectively dealing with non-knowledge in science and at contrib-
uting to a better understanding of public controversies. This re-
quires outlining and acknowledging different modes of framing
the unknown in science and society. We illustrate our approach
using the example of agro-biotechnology and the controversy over
genetically modified organisms (GMO). This field is characterised

































Molecular biologists rely on controlled experimental conditions …
2 Unlike Walker et al. (2003, p. 13), we include epistemic uncertainty and
variability uncertainty in a broad conception of non-knowledge.
3 The project Cultures of Non-Knowledge is conducted by the Environmental
Science Center of the University of Augsburg (www.wzu.uni-augsburg.de/
Projekte/Nichtwissenskulturen.htm) and supported by the German Federal
Department of Education and Research (BMBF) within its programme
Knowledge for Decision-Making Processes – Research in the Context of Science,
Politics and Society.
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tion to what is not known regarding the possible consequences of
technological innovation. We analyse how molecular biology and
ecology, the two most important scientific (sub-)disciplines in the
area of agro-biotechnology, deal with non-knowledge. Based on
this, we seek to outline societal implications of the fact that there
are at least two discernible scientific cultures within the GMO de-
bate, which differ significantly in the ways they deal with what is
not known.
Cultures of Non-Knowledge: Conceptual Approach
Epistemic Cultures as Cultures of Non-Knowledge
Knorr Cetina (1999) has shown that two influential scientific
(sub-)disciplines – high-energy physics and molecular biology –
differ widely in their practices of “making knowledge”. Thus, as
she concludes, the sciences can be understood as being differen-
tiated into various “epistemic cultures” or “scientific cultures of
knowledge”. These consist of and are constituted by sets of specif-
ic practices of generating, validating, and communicating knowl-
edge, each of which is characteristic of its respective (sub-)disci-
plinary field. What is remarkable in Knorr Cetina’s study is that
these cultures of knowledge include specific practices of produc-
ing and dealing with non-knowledge. Thus they can also be inter-
preted as “cultures of non-knowledge”. 
As Knorr Cetina demonstrates, high-energy physics is very
attentive to the limits of its knowledge: disturbances, distortions,
errors, unexpected events, or uncertainties. Its epistemic strate-
gy focuses on the active search for what she has termed “liminal
knowledge”, i. e., the expertise of dealing with the boundaries of
knowledge. In contrast, molecular biology is not (indeed perhaps
cannot be) very interested in the limits of its knowledge or in its
self-generated non-knowledge. If experiments fail or expose un-
foreseen results, molecular biologists usually do not explore the
causes any further, but vary the conditions of the experiment un-
til the expected type of outcome emerges (Knorr Cetina 1999). To
refer to this heuristic strategy, Knorr Cetina has coined the term
“semi-blind variation” (Knorr Cetina 1999, p.110). She argues that
this should not be interpreted as a sign of epistemic sloppiness,
but as a requirement of the specific research fields and objects of
molecular biology.
Another strand in environmental research provides similar
conclusions concerning cultures of (non-)knowledge. Based on
a comparative analysis of the BSE crisis and the political and in-
stitutional responses to it in Great Britain and Germany, Wynne
and Dressel (2001) differentiate between two (or more) “cultures
of uncertainty”: While a more empiricist-orientated British (An-
glo-Saxon) institutional culture only accepts robust evidence (e.g.,
specified causal models) as justifying environmental protection,
the general public in continental European countries (particular-
ly Germany) is more willing to act on the grounds of uncertain-
ty or even “merely” presumed non-knowledge in a precautionary
approach (for the latter, see CEC 2000). Unlike Knorr Cetina, Wyn-
ne and Dressel do not refer to the scientific cultures of (non-)
knowledge underlying the production of knowledge, but to nation-
al cultures of the evaluation of evidence underlying societal deci-
sions.4
Dimensions of Non-Knowledge 
To make the concept of cultures of non-knowledge applicable to
empirical research, we need to specify and further develop it. A
first set of rather general criteria for specifying different cultures
of non-knowledge can be derived from sociological observation
of the ways in which non-knowledge (often tacitly) is recognised,
(often indirectly) defined, and (often implicitly) dealt with in vari-
ous social contexts. As a means of specification, we propose three
dimensions of non-knowledge (table 1; see also Wehling 2006): 
The first dimension refers to knowledge (or awareness) of non-
knowledge, which spreads between full awareness of non-
knowledge (we know what we don’t know) and complete un-
awareness (“unknown unknowns”). 
The second dimension, intentionality of non-knowledge, con-
trasts unintended non-knowledge with the conscious refusal
of certain cognitions. 
The third dimension, temporal stability (or reducibility) of non-
knowledge, extends from what is not yet known, but (presum-
ably) does not present any substantial difficulties to cognition,
to the entirely “unknowable” and therefore uncontrollable. 
Detailed specifications of the quality of the unknown due to its
various possible locations within this three-dimensional space
are a constituent part of different (and sometimes competing)
cultures of non-knowledge within the sciences as well as in the
public sphere (Grove-White 2001).5
Characteristic Traits of Cultures of Non-Knowledge
A second set of analytic criteria is more specific to epistemic
practices and routines within the sciences. Our basic idea is that
practices of dealing with non-knowledge should be studied with
regard to certain key issues that are crucial to experimentation
and epistemic strategies. We elaborated five key traits of cultures
of non-knowledge:
1. What temporal and spatial scale is considered adequate for
knowledge to be valid, reliable, and complete in a particular
scientific area? How long and on what spatial scale should
scientists carry out observations until they can be reasonably
confident that specific technologies have no harmful effects:
six weeks, six months, three years, or two decades? The syn-
thetic hormone diethylstilboestrol (DES), for instance, turned
out to be the cause of cancer in young women whose mothers
had taken it during pregnancy fifteen to twenty years before
(Ibarreta and Swan 2001). 
4 For the interrelation of social and scientific regimes, see Jasanoff (2004).
5 Whether a fourth dimension referring to the situatedness of non-knowledge
within a community or society (collective versus local/individual non-knowledge)
adds further analytical power to the model, remains open for discussion.
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2. How are unforeseen events and unexpected results dealt with?
Are they merely negligible “disturbances” and temporary ab-
errations from the “true” processes of knowledge generation?
Or should they be taken seriously, perhaps even searched for
deliberately, as sufficient reasons for critically evaluating and
possibly modifying the underlying assumptions? 
3. How are complexity, diversity, uncertainty, ambiguity, indeter-
minacy, and limits of knowledge addressed?
4. What are the ways and routines of coping with de- and re-con-
textualisation of knowledge (Bonss et al. 1993a and 1993b)?
Strand (2000) in regard to the life sciences has termed it the
in vivo-in vitro problem: Do scientists tacitly assume that their
research objects (genetically modified organisms, nanoparti-
cles, chemicals, etc.) behave in the natural environment exact-
ly as they do in the controlled and artificial setting of the lab-
oratory? Or do researchers take into account the probability or
even unavoidability of hitherto unknown effects resulting from
the non-transparent multiplicity of influencing factors under
real-world conditions? Strand criticises the former attitude as
“epistemological optimism” or “naivety” and pleads for a more
reliable and self-critical “epistemological disillusion”.
5. How pronounced is the disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and
transdisciplinary (self-)reflexivity of a scientific culture? 
Cultures of Non-Knowledge in 
Agro-Biotechnology 
The controversy, both scientific and political, over the release of
genetically modified plants offers a good example for studying dif-
ferent cultures of non-knowledge. Firstly, because a wide range of
scientific disciplines is involved in the ongoing debates. Second-
ly, because the “politicisation of ignorance” (Stocking and Holstein
1993) apparently plays an important role in the conflict (e.g., Wyn-
ne 2001). Thirdly, because a closure of the debate over appropri-
ate modes of political intervention is not in sight, and the elabo-
ration of innovative analytical tools for democratic deliberation
seems overdue. 
In the field of agro-biotechnology, we consider four scientific
(sub-)disciplines to be particularly important and influential: mo-
lecular biology (including genetics), ecology (especially ecosys-
tem research), agricultural sciences (including plant breeding and
cultivation), and medical sciences (including veterinary and hu-
man medicine). Within these fields, molecular biology and ecolo-
gy play central roles in shaping and advancing scientific practices
and bodies of knowledge. They possess specific ways to generate
and handle non-knowledge. However, molecular biology and ecolo-
gy are rarely linked by interdisciplinary cooperation. When asked
for an explanation of this situation, one interviewed molecular bi-
ologist referred to their divergent interests, belief systems, and ide-
ologies, resulting in a gap between their proponents and disabling
exchange and joint research. The two approaches of molecular bi-
ology and ecology to knowledge production and non-knowledge
are described in the following, drawing on interviews with molec-
ular biologists and ecologists (see box). 
Molecular Biology: Controlled Conditions 
In the field of agro-biotechnology, applied molecular biology
merges two influential positions: the scientific interest and labo-
ratory research practices of genetics in identifying chromosomes,
genes, and their respective functions, and the traditions of plant
breeding, providing plant varieties with certain desired traits and/
or high yields under field conditions. The latter is currently being
implemented through the techniques of molecular farming and
metabolic engineering. Both positions are characterised by labo-
ratory-bench research (as context of discovery and validation), by
traditional plant breeding (as context of comparison and explana-
tion), and by a specific (variable) link to agricultural production
and industry (as context of funding and as context of application
and social legitimisation). Consequently, the temporal and spa- >
BOX: Methodology
The comparative reconstruction of scientific cultures of non-knowl-
edge is designed to clarify the ways in which their everyday practices,
their prevalent styles of thought (including their affinities to certain
attitudes and concerns), and their heuristic and perceptive horizons
(including their blind spots) result in distinct assumptions concern-
ing non-knowledge and the best ways of dealing with it under condi-
tions of social and ecological risk.
The methodology applied in our research project consists of an anal-
ysis of the research situation in Germany, based on preliminary talks
with experts and on literature research in relevant journals. This was
followed by in-depth structured interviews with German scientists in
the field of agro-biotechnology. We conducted 36 interviews that in-
cluded fifteen active scientists, whose anonymity was guaranteed. 
As all interviews were conducted in Germany, the interviewees refer
to the German debate and research context. Although all interviewed
scientists are in close contact with their international scientific com-
munities and refer to international research methods and standards,
we have to keep in mind that public debate, GMO regulation, and
agro-biotechnological industry differ significantly between the USA
and the EU (e.g., Gaskell et al. 1999, Joly and Marris 2001)a as well
as within Europe. The GMO debate is admittedly more complex than
can be shown in this article, for instance, concerning the different
international regulation strategies and practices (e.g., Borrás 2006),
or concerning shifts in the underlying debate on risk management
procedures (Klinke and Renn 2002, IRGC 2005).
a For similarities, see Marris et al. (2001).




knowledge (or awareness) of non-knowledge
fully recognised completely unrecognised
intentionality of non-knowledge
unintended consciously refused
temporal stability (or reducibility) of non-knowledge
not yet known entirely unknowable
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tial awareness of molecular biologists is to a great extent deter-
mined by de-contextualised laboratory experiments aiming at the
production of stable organismic constructs under controlled con-
ditions (table 2):
What we are actually doing here is introducing genes into plants
and observing at a molecular-biological level what happens: That
is, how does the plant react to the new gene?What aspect of the gene
does the plant recognise? Why does it recognise this aspect? What
mechanisms are involved in the recognition process? What does the
plant do with these mechanisms and how can we control them? 
a molecular biologist (interview no. 13a, p. 131)6
In contrast to agricultural plant breeding, in molecular biology the
total life cycle of an organism and the statistical evaluation of crop
output versus crop loss are of secondary importance in scientif-
ic publications. Unforeseen or unintended results, such as insta-
bility, deformation, or death of living objects during the time span
of the research process, pose crucial questions to the scientists.
They must decide whether such results are due to a lack of experi-
mental control or to unknown characteristics of the objects them-
selves, and whether the results should be ignored or analysed and
converted into a new research hypothesis.7 Under conditions of
time pressure, financial constraints, and the need to produce re-
liable results, practical conduct may diverge from theory:
The system itself forces us, so to speak, to consider only those
questions which are answerable. 
a molecular biologist (interview no. 13a, p. 144)6
One molecular biologist recalled a research project on herbicide-
resistant plants, during which the search for a scientific explana-
tion for the death of the plant population led to a major scientific
breakthrough and completely new information about the organ-
isms studied. But one of his colleagues remarked that such a thor-
ough exploration is rather unusual:
In general things work differently. We have a set topic, such as vac-
cine production in transgenic plants, and naturally we have to see
that we achieve something worth presenting. Finding out why some-
thing went wrong and what exactly is going on in the plant can
only be of secondary importance. 
a molecular biologist (interview no. 13b, p. 471)6
Molecular biologists develop a certain expertise in controlling their
experimental conditions (such as molecular object characteristics,
diurnal temperature changes, chemical instabilities of the culture
medium) to avoid the unforeseen and unintended: 
I have to define my system very precisely to get answers. If I have
too many variables which aren’t under my control, I usually can’t
interpret the results.
a molecular biologist (interview no. 19, p. 249)6
Consequently, research in a specific and controlled context is usu-
ally highly developed and the epistemic systems are closely ana-
lysed. However, it seems to be uncommon to take other possible
contexts into consideration – whether they be biological, ecologi-
cal, or social. A paradoxical result of this is that the controlled re-
search setting in the laboratory appears to be a source of both re-
liable knowledge and non-knowledge. The better the system is
defined, the more variables tend to remain out of focus.
Within the scientific culture of molecular biology, the percep-
tion of non-knowledge and possible risks of GMO is mainly guid-
ed by the comparison of biotechnological methods with modern
plant breeding. Agro-biotechnology is described as relatively well
controlled and therefore well understood. A per se difference bet-
ween biotechnological interference and conventional breeding,
between (supposedly) substantially equivalent products of differ-
ent technological origins, is rejected. Non-knowledge is treated as
specific, temporary, and reducible, although the existence of un-
avoidable uncertainties is admitted in theory. The attitude of mo-
lecular biologists regarding impacts of GMO can be called “semi-
blind confidence” (in reference to “semi-blind variation”): Their
experience in everyday research is that living objects highly resist
their attempts to transform them. Why, then, should other organ-
isms be transformed by mere contact with GMO? In addition, the
discovery of molecular repair systems that ensure stable genetic
conditions during evolution appears to lead researchers into trust-
ing in effective self-regulation mechanisms which eliminate un-
intended and undesired results:
I would say that the biological mechanisms of an organism are
trained to eliminate malfunctions. Biochemically speaking, a gene
will survive only when something really functions. Through experi-
ence I have learnt that many insertions are lost again during trans-
formation. 
a molecular biologist (interview no. 12, p. 299)6
This attitude of “semi-blind confidence” tends to be assigned to
all natural systems such as agro-ecosystems where genetically
modified corn is released. It is supported by the claim of an over-
all absence of contradictory evidence.
Ecology: Anticipating the Unexpected
Ecologists, as proponents of a so-called weak discipline, face
greater difficulties in producing reliable, reproducible results as
compared to molecular biology researchers. They often have a wide
range of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary connections. In
transdisciplinary projects aiming at nature preservation and eco-
system management, the scientific interest lies in the object world
afield, captured by observation, idiographic description, compar-
ative analysis, and field experimentation. This is complemented
by laboratory research and computer modelling. Invasive tech-
niques of investigation are only introduced in a second step. An
attentive and unrestricted view is a valued skill, adopted to avoid
the unintentional reduction of unrecognised key details. Complex-
6 The unpublished interviews are archived as part of the project Cultures of Non-
Knowledge at the Environmental Science Center of the University of Augsburg.
7 For further methodological differentiation between technical objects and
epistemic things, see Rheinberger (1997).
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ity, diversity, vitality, and contextuality (or interconnectedness) are
acknowledged characteristics of the object world (table 2). 
The typical methodological procedure within my research project
was to go afield and to look after rape and possible hybrid partners
in every accessible corner. Not only did we scan sites where we would
expect them, we searched for them area-wide. We also looked at
places where one would think it wasn’t worth it (…). We did find
that the actual hybrid partners were quite numerous in the city.
Indeed, the city district X turned out to be a rich source. We really
hadn’t expected to find such a diversity centre of rape and hybrid
partner plants in this of all places. 
an ecologist (interview no. 6, p. 83–86)6
In contrast to molecular biology, ecology seems to intend to open
and broaden its perceptual horizons beyond what could be “ra-
tionally” expected. Temporal and spatial scales are far-reaching.
Ecologists attempt to describe different and distinctly character-
ised entities (genes versus organisms, inter-species differences,
geographic specificities, living versus non-living systems, etc.)
by in situ observations and idiographic descriptions:
We often go out relatively unencumbered and just look: What is
actually happening outside? And then we allow ourselves to be sur-
prised by what we find: We observe this and then try to evaluate
our findings without looking for a specific systematic condition that
has to be achieved. Thus, quite different objects are perceived at the
same time, and we see how many unexpected developments there
are. You come to realise how often what you observe differs from
what you actually expected to find. It is our recurrent finding that
self-organised natural systems are highly resistant to our planning.
This aspect of self-organisation is perceived less as a disturbing fac-
tor that has to be eliminated, but rather as an actual characteris-
tic of the systems. 
an ecologist (interview no. 4, p. 202)6
In ecology, non-knowledge is seen as the result of the contingent
experimental research strategy and the problematic (re-)transfer
of experimental results to open, complex, and dynamic natural
systems. This attitude is underlined by recurrent failures in fore-
casting the behaviour of natural entities. Particularly in ecosystem
ecology, major epistemic strategies appear to consist of maintain-
ing an unprejudiced openness towards surprise and of a paradox-
ical effort “to expect the unexpected” in order to test and modify
prevalent theoretical assumptions:
Thus we often find in fieldwork that we observe phenomena which
we had not expected at the outset; but afterwards, during the anal-
ysis, we realise that we actually could have anticipated them. 
an ecologist (interview no. 4, p. 217)6
As the same ecologist explains, this orientation towards the un-
expected is difficult to realise, since observation in absence of any
expectation and focus of attention is impossible:
There is also, so to speak, an attempt to operationalise the area of
non-knowledge and to say that we are looking for unexpected ef-
fects. This leads to an antinomic situation: How can we observe
something which we don’t know is relevant, whilst taking into con-
sideration that we are unable to observe everything that could be
observed, but have to make a suitable selection for study? 
an ecologist (interview no. 4, p. 217)6
To overcome this dilemma – the inadequacy of reducing the ob-
ject world to its anticipated, observable traits, and the impossibil-
ity of observing the unanticipated – ecologists have developed strat-
egies of coping with conditions of restricted knowledge in risk >




























Cultures of non-knowledge within molecular biology and ecology. The epistemic strategy of openness for the unanticipated and handling of the 
unknown within ecology contrasts with that of drawing the attention to controlled experimental conditions within molecular biology.
TABLE 2:
cultural traits
1 temporal and spatial scale and specification of the knowledge 
produced
2 dealing with unforeseen events and unexpected results
3 dealing with complexity, diversity, uncertainty,
ambiguity, indeterminacy, and limits of knowledge
4 de- and re-contextualisation of scientific knowledge
5 disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and transdisciplinary (self-)reflexivity
molecular biology: 
control-oriented scientific culture
small; irrespective of time and space
avoidance of uncontrolled situations
reduction of complexity to allow for
the production of “hard facts”
de-contextualisation in vitro
focussed on product marketability
ecology: 
uncertainty-oriented scientific culture
small to large; relating to temporal and 
spatial contexts
methodological sensitivity
acknowledgement of complexity; acceptance of 
idiographic and preliminary data
observation in situ
focussed on ecosystem conservation
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situations. They adopt a precautionary attitude and try to specify
different forms of non-knowledge requiring different forms of
precaution. An example is the categorisation of genetically modi-
fied plant species according to the uncertainty and risk associated
with their release in a certain ecosystem, resulting in suggestions
for different strategies of precautionary measurement (Breckling
and Verhoefen 2004, Menzel et al. 2005). 
Integrating Non-Knowledge into Democratic
Deliberation and Policy
We started our argument referring to cases in which knowledge
was ignored by society and non-knowledge was not recognised,
resulting in harmful effects. This led to the political demand to
take possibly harmful unknown unknowns into account. In our
so-called knowledge society, epistemic cultures develop specific
expertise not only in the production of knowledge, but also in the
handling of non-knowledge. Our comparison of molecular biolo-
gy and ecology in the field of agro-biotechnology exposed the ex-
istence of two different scientific cultures of non-knowledge –
one that is based on the reliability and regularity of causal interre-
lations established in the controlled setting of the laboratory, the
other focussing on the ubiquity of unanticipated, unforeseeable,
or even unrecognisable effects under varying real-world condi-
tions.We conclude that the specific traits of the epistemic cultures
help to characterise science-based non-knowledge in detail. More-
over, our analysis provides a source to critically discuss and broad-
en our societal capability to handle situations of non-knowledge.
As in science, societies can, in principle, choose between a con-
trol-oriented and an uncertainty-oriented approach (table 2) in
situations of unknown risks. Experts from specific scientific disci-
plines may advocate those options that are more familiar or more
consistent with their own epistemic style. Each culture of non-
knowledge is associated with specific (implicit/explicit) motives
and based on specific (known/unknown) implications and limi-
tations. At the same time, they are equally “scientific”, “rational”,
and potentially helpful. This has far-reaching consequences, not
only for science studies but also for political deliberation and
decision making in various fields. It seems of major importance 
to acknowledge non-knowledge in the sciences as well as in
the public debate;8
to elaborate and preserve a variety of cultures of non-knowl-
edge as a basis of intercultural critique and as a rich source of
future action;
to think of different societal options of precautionary political
actions, referring to different cultures of (non-)knowledge;
to societally reflect upon and discuss the world views and im-
plicit value systems inherent in different cultures of non-knowl-
edge and actions of precautionary politics.
The fact that we can discern different scientific cultures of non-
knowledge raises several questions which are likely to be of fun-
damental importance for future socio-ecological developments: 
What can modern societies and their institutions learn from
control-oriented and from uncertainty-oriented scientific cul-
tures of non-knowledge?
Is it realistic to think we can completely avoid non-knowledge
– and risks based on non-knowledge – by controlling real-
world situations? To what extent is this socially desirable? 
What are the alternatives to “first-order knowledge” via control-
led experiments and to precautionary strategies based on the
enhancement of system control? How can first- and second-
order approaches in science and policy be integrated in a sen-
sible way? 
The present societal and political reactions towards emerging risk
technologies such as biotechnology suggest that we are current-
ly extending the range of uncertainty-oriented approaches in or-
der to avoid negative socio-ecological (side-)effects in the present
and future (Böschen 2005). The following examples can be inter-
preted as first steps in this direction: the post-market monitoring
of GMO and their general environmental surveillance; the step-
by-step and case-by-case procedures regarding the permission to
release and market GMO (e.g., Tiedje et al. 1989)9; the develop-
ment of “second-order indicators” (second-order knowledge) to
evaluate the specific risk associated with the release of specific
chemicals10 (Scheringer 2004, p.94) or genetically modified plants11
(Menzel et al. 2005) even before they are released. With the recent
turn toward precautionary politics within the EU, a broader discus-
sion and a more detailed conceptualisation seem adequate. 
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